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NOTE

SPLITTING THE SMALL CORPORATION BY DIVISIVE
REORGANIZATION: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
SECTIONS 355 AND 368 (a) (1) (D)
Many circumstances might prompt a small corporation to surrender control of part of its assets to shareholders who intend to
continue using them in the conduct of active business. Such a desired
splitting of the corporation could be accomplished if the corporation
redeemed stock with active business assets or if it distributed active
business assets as a liquidating dividend. But when the value of assets
distributed exceeds the basis of stock exchanged, a redemption or
liquidation would result in an immediate capital gains tax to shareholders.1
However, a properly effected divisive reorganization is not taxable
to shareholders, provided no "boot" 2 is distributed as part of the
transaction. In absence of boot, the recognition of any gain realized
is postponed until such time as shareholders deem it wise to sell their
distributed shares, since those shares take on the same basis as shares
exchanged for them.3 Because divisive reorganization can be tax
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1001, 1031 (a), 1221, 302(a), 331 (a), 346(a). The
subsequent reincorporation of assets might cause their distribution to be substantively equivalent to an ordinary dividend taxed under §301 or §856(a)(2).
See H.R. RE. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954); Treas. Reg. §1.831-1 (c)
(1955); Schwartz, Reincorporations Under the 1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 159
(1959). See also Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962). Of course, distributing
a dividend is another method of splitting the corporation, but it is very prohibitive
taxwise. An outright purchase of assets by shareholders for cash or other property
is another alternative, but it requires a heavy out-of-pocket expense and would
result in a capital gains tax to the corporation if the assets were appreciated.
2. "Boot" is property received by shareholders, other than stock in the newlycreated corporation. It includes money and other property, short-term notes,
stock rights, or warrants (but see §304 (a)), securities in some instances (see note
5 infra), and stock not controlled immediately before distribution (cf. Rev. Rul.
63-260, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 147).
Generally, if a split-off or split-up is effected, boot will be taxed at capital
gains rate, and recognized gain may not exceed the amount of the boot, §356 (a) (1).
But if the distribution of boot has the effect of a dividend, it shall be taxed as
such up to the amount of the corporation's earnings and profits, §356 (a)(2). Compare Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 288 (1945), with William H.
Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963), and Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d
Cir. 1956). If a spin-off is effected, boot is taxed as a §301 dividend, §356 (b). No
loss is ever recognized on an exchange or distribution, §356 (c). See generally
Friedman, Divisive Reorganization Under the 1954 Code, 10 TAx L. REv. 487,
506-14 (1955); Moore, Taxation of DistributionMade in Connection With Corporate Reorganizations, 17 TAX L. REv. 129 (1961).
3. INT. Riv. CODE OF 1954, §358 (a). If all the shares in the distributing corporation are not exchanged, allocation of basis is made between the stock received
and the stock retained, §358 (b) (2). If a spin-off is effected, a similar allocation is
[330]
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free and may be used to split a single or multibusiness corporation, it
is a vital consideration when the shareholders of a small prosperous
corporation want to accommodate special needs by continuing business in separately owned corporations.
The attainment of a tax-free divisive reorganization effected
through section 355 is the subject matter of this note. This note does
not deal directly with the division of a corporate complex under
section 355, which entails the distribution of stock of already existing
subsidiaries. Nor is it concerned with a divisive reorganization effected through section 354, which requires the transfer of "substantially
all" the assets of one corporation to another so that the first corporation becomes a shell. Finally, this note does not deal with the
matter of boot. It presumes there will be no need to distribute boot
since a large amount of liquid and investment assets may be placed in
the newly-formed corporation without contaminating the nontaxability of the reorganization.4 This note, then, purports only to explain how closed corporations can comply with the provisions of section 355 in order to avoid pitfalls that may cause shareholders to be
immediately taxed when divisive reorganization is undertaken.
T.ERms, POLICY, AND HISTORY

A corporation effects a nontaxable divisive reorganization when it
transfers part of its assets to another corporation in exchange for the
latter's stock, then distributes that stock to its shareholders. The
corporation transferring assets and distributing stock is called the
"distributing corporation." The corporation to which it transfers
assets and from which it acquires stock is called the "controlled corporation" or the "newly organized corporation" (or some derivative
thereof). When the distributing corporation distributes the stock of
the controlled corporation to its shareholders, it has divided or separated the controlled corporation from itself.
The first phase of divisive reorganization consists of a corporation
transferring part of its assets to a newly-formed corporation in exchange for that corporation's stock. 5 This transaction will not be
made on the basis of a fictional exchange. Recipient shareholders are seen as
receiving back their retained shares with distributed stock, §358 (c).
4. See discussion notes 117-121 infra. Of course, the boot provisions become
very important if cash and other property are distributed in liquidation or redemption and business is resumed thereafter with the distributed properties. The
Commissioner can assert the step transaction doctrine to classify the transaction
as a divisive reorganization in which taxable boot was distributed. See Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961); David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
5. In addition to common stock, preferred stock may be received and distributed tax free as long as "the effect of the transaction is not substantially the same
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taxable even if the reorganization subsequently fails to qualify under
section 355. As long as the distributing corporation or its shareholders
were in control of the newly created corporation immediately after
the transfer of assets, section 351 (a) insures nonrecognition of gain. 6
The second phase of divisive reorganization is the distribution of
the stock of the controlled corporation to the shareholders of the
distributing corporation. It is probably unnecessary for the distributing corporation to actually receive the shares of the controlled corporation and distribute them itself to shareholders. As an incident of
beneficial ownership of the shares, the distributing corporation may
command the controlled corporation to make the distribution. A
direct distribution by the controlled corporation simultaneous with
the transfer of assets to it by the distributing corporation does not
7
change the substance of the transaction.
Regardless of which corporation physically distributes the stock,
the manner in which the distribution is completed determines the
type of reorganization effected. The distributing corporation "splitsup" into new corporations if it exchanges the stock of two or more
controlled corporations for all of its own outstanding shares. If the
as a receipt of a stock dividend."

INT. REV.

CODE OF

1954, §306 (c)(1) (B). See

Treas. Reg. §1.306-3(d) (1955). Note, too, that even if a preferred distribution
does successfully run the §306 gauntlet, it may cause the whole transaction to
become taxable as a "device to distribute earnings," INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§355 (a)(1)(B). See generally BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COPORATrONs
AND SHAREHOLDERS 349-52 (student ed. 1963).
Securities of the controlled may also be received and distributed, but only in
exchange for securities in the distributing corporation, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§355 (a) (1) (A) (ii). If the principal amount of securities in the controlled corporation exceeds that of securities in the distributing corporation, the fair market
value of such excess is taxable boot, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §356(d)(2)(C). Of
course, control of the controlled corporation cannot be acquired by receipt of
securities, alone, cf. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940), or by receipt of stock
and securities that are essentially short-term notes so as to make the exchange
really a sale, Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
6. Treas. Reg. §1.351-1 (a) (1955); Rev. Rul. 56-266, 56-1 CUM. BULL. 184. See
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1954); Freidman, supra note 2, at 492.

Of course, the transfer would be taxable if boot were received,

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §351 (b).
7. Bremer v. White, 10 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass. 1935); Gross v. Commissioner,
88 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1937); Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021, 1025 n. 1 (1964);
H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947 (1963). Cf. Commissioner v. Morgan, 288
F.2d 676, 679 (3d Cir. 1961); Reef Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379, 394 (April
1965); Rev. Rul. 57-311, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 243. Furthermore, the language of
§368 (a)(1)(D) seemingly contemplates the propriety of a one-step transaction "if
immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders
. . . or any combination thereof is in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred." A direct distribution appears to be a way to avoid a
double excise tax, H. Grady Lester, Jr., id.
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distributing corporation exchanges the stock of a controlled corporation for part of its outstanding stock, it "splits-off" a corporation.
And if the distributing corporation simply distributes the shares of
the controlled corporation to its shareholders without an exchange
of stock, it "spins-off" a corporation. 8
The theory underlying the nonrecognition of gain upon divisive
reorganization is that businessmen should have full flexibility in
their business operations and should be free to adjust their methods
of conducting business without incurring adverse taxes. 9 When a corporation transfers part of its assets to a controlled corporation and
then distributes the stock of that corporation to its shareholders, no
real economic change has taken place; only the form of the asset
ownership is different. Assets previously in one corporation are now
in two corporations. Their specie is unchanged, and they are controlled in the same proportion by the same shareholders who controlled them prior to separation.
However, the tax deferral Congress allows for a business readjustment offers incentive for tax abuse. Seemingly, instead of distributing a dividend, a corporation could transfer assets to a controlled corporation and distribute control of that corporation to its
shareholders tax free. The shareholders then could sell the shares
of the former subsidiary, or they could liquidate it and sell its assets. In either case, any gain would be taxed at capital gains rates.10
This tax free separation of assets from a corporation to realize a
capital gain instead of an ordinary one, is called "earnings bail-out."
The history of the tax treatment accorded divisive reorganizations has
revolved about the prevention of this abuse of tax leniency. In 1924
Congress permitted any kind of divisive reorganization to be nontaxable if it was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization and if
8. A Hypothetical Split-Up: Stockholders A and B of AB Corporation disagree and want to divide their business into corporations of different names. Onehalf of the business assets may be transferred to Y Corporation and one-half to
Z Corporation, the stock of each going to AB Corporation. AB distributes Y stock
to A and Z stock to B in exchange for their AB stock. AB then dissolves.
A Hypothetical Split-Off: If stockholder A wants to retain the name of AB for
his corporation because of the goodwill factor, one-half of AB's assets could be
transferred to Z Corporation in exchange for its stock, with AB then distributing
the Z stock to shareholder B in exchange for his AB stock. Both AB and Z
Corporations continue active business thereafter.
A Hypothetical Spin-Off: AB Corporation has an ice cream plant in Florida
and one in Georgia. For ease of management purposes, the assets of the Georgia
plant are transferred to Z Corporation for its stock. That stock is then distributed
to the shareholders of AB Corporation in equal amounts.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924).
10. A tax savings would result in the amount of the difference between the
individual income tax rate applied to the value of the assets and the capital gains
rate applied to the value of the shares minus their bases.
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either the distributing corporation or its stockholders had control of
the controlled corporation immediately after distribution of the latter's stock." The Revenue Act of 193412 sought to halt the widespread
misuse of the statute by prohibiting tax-free spin-offs.13 In 1951, Congress once again recognized spin-offs as nontaxable, and chose to
regulate divisive reorganizations by requiring that the distributing and
the controlled corporations continue, or intend to continue, active
conduct of business after distribution and that the entire transaction
14
not be a device for the distribution of earnings.
Today, a divisive reorganization involving part of a corporation's
assets may be undertaken without tax consequences to shareholders
if the distribution of the stock of a newly created corporation is made
pursuant to a plan of reorganization- and qualifies under section 355.
Since a plan of reorganization is a formality that has to appear only
on the record of the corporation,16 and perhaps does not have to be
reduced to writing or take any form at all, 1" the requirements of

section 355 substantively govern the taxability of distributions in
connection with divisive reorganizations. 18 The qualifying provisions
of that section are listed briefly below and then discussed more fully
in the text that follows.
(1) The shareholders of the distributing corporation must receive all of, or a controlling portion of, the shares of the controlled corporation.
11. Revenue Act of 1924, §203 (e), 43 Stat. 256. This was initial congressional
approval of a tax free spin-off. As early as 1918, tax free split-ups had been permitted. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § §112 (g) (1) (D), (2) (b) (3).
13. Jacobs, The Pre-Distribution Two Business Rule- Edmund P. Coady and
Beyond, 19 TAx L. REv. 155, 158 (1962); Estate of Lockwood v. Commissioner, 65-2
U.S. Tax Cas. f9646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 1965). Split-ups and split-offs continued
to be regarded as valid.
14. Revenue Act of 1951, §317 (a), 65 Stat. 473.
15. INT. REV. CODE Op 1954, §368 (a) (1) (D). The definition of a "plan of
reorganization" is set forth in Treas. Reg. §1 .3 6 8 -2(g) (1965). Essentially a plan
restricts nonrecognition of gain or loss to distributions of stock that are directly a
part of the reorganization.
16. Treas. Reg. §1.368-3 (a) (1962).
17. C.I Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1937); James G.
Murrin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955). See Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.
1961); South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. No. 540 (1965). There must be
evidence that a plan was followed, however. Its formulation must be more than
an afterthought. Goldstein Bros. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1956).
If the Commissioner is asserting that the transaction is a divisive reorganization in
order to tax related property distributions as boot, he does not have to prove the
existence of a plan. He has only to show the fact of reorganization. See James
Armour, Inc. 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
18. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 6, at 274.
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(2) A corporation that is divided or enterprises that are separated must have conducted active trade or business for five years.
Furthermore, the emerging corporations must conduct active business immediately after distribution.
(3) The transaction must not be used principally as a device
for the distribution of earnings and profits.
CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION PROVISIONS

Upon reorganization, the corporate form of conducting business
is adjusted while the beneficial ownership of assets continues. Continuity of shareholder interest is prerequisite to any type of reorganization. With special regard to divisive reorganizations, however,
Congress codified' 9 what it considered to be ownership sufficient to
maintain continuity of interest: some shareholders of the distributing
corporation must receive a controlling amount of the stock in the
newly created corporation.
As stipulated by section 368 (c), the shareholders receive a controlling amount of stock when they obtain ownership of at least eighty
per cent of all voting stock and at least eighty per cent of all other
kinds of stock. Ownership of a controlling portion of shares can be
constructively obtained through related persons or controlled entities.
Shareholders have been found to own shares constructively if they
were the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust, the settlors of a revocable trust,20 if their corporation received control, or if they received
control for a corporate owner. 21 But constructive ownership should
be limited to instances in which a free interchange of ownership by
gift would be likely. Such ownership of control would be consistent
with the continuity of interest philosophy, especially since shareholders who owned direct control could make a subsequent bona fide
gift of shares without generating an earnings bail-out, provided the
shares were not thereafter redeemed. 22 Thus, ownership should be
attributed to an estate through a distribution to vested beneficiaries,
to a partnership through distribution to partners, or to a father
through a distribution to his son; but, distribution should not be
attributed to a partner through a distribution to another partner, nor
to a conditional vendor through a distribution to a conditional
23
vendee.
19. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§355 (a) (1) (A), (D), (2) (A); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 6, at 267.
20. Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1959). Cf. Reef Corp.,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379, 396 (1965).
21. Reef Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379, 397 (1965).
22. Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959); Rev. Rul. 62-138,
1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 95.
23. Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 473 (1965) (attribution rules of §318 not
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The statute not only requires that shareholders must receive control, but also that the distributing corporation must distribute all
the stock of the controlled corporation, unless retention of up to
4
twenty per cent of it is shown not to have a tax avoidance purpose.2
This provision should not be interpreted as directing that eighty
per cent of the stock must be distributed to shareholders and the rest
must be distributed to anyone of the corporation's choice. A distribution to persons other than shareholders should be the same thing
as retaining the shares, and should not be permitted unless there is
a bona fide business purpose motivating it. Conceivably, distribution
to a nonshareholder or retention by the distributing corporation could
be properly motivated by the need to give a key employee a small
interest in the newly organized corporation or to satisfy a business
commitment such as a stock option or a mortgage obligation. 25

But

the statute sets up a presumption against the "goodness" of the motivating purpose, and failure to rebut that presumption would disqualify the whole transaction from coming under section 355.
While the shareholders of the distributing corporation should
receive all the shares of the controlled corporation they cannot fail
to receive an amount less than eighty per cent.2 6 The urgency of a

business reason does not compensate for noncompliance with the objective language of the statute. 27 The step transaction doctrine will
not be utilized in favor of the taxpayer in order to view a distribution
in excess of twenty per cent to nonshareholders as first being made
to shareholders and then being transferred by them to the nonshare2 8

holders.

Moreover, the step transaction doctrine will be used against
taxpayers when the control provisions are literally complied with,
applicable to reorganizations regarding option to purchase agreements). Cf. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§318 (a) (2) (B), (C); Treas. Reg. §1.267 (b)-(1) (b) (1958).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §355 (a)(1)(D). See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note
6, at 266. The statute actually says all the shares that the distributing corporation
owns immediately before distribution must be distributed. However, this is designed for a corporation that does not own all the stock of a preexisting subsidiary,
and such would not be the case with the divisive reorganizations. The new corporation, as agent of the distributing corporation, also should not be able to withhold 20% of the shares unless it can show no tax avoidance purpose.
25. See BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 339; Comment, Divisive Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 67 YALE L.J. 38, 41 n.63 (1957);
see authorities cited notes 30 and 31 infra.
26. Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Austin Transit, Inc., 20 T.C. 849,
855-56 (1953).
27. See Rinkel v. Knox, 196 F. Supp. 21 (D. Minn. 1961); Hyman H. Berghash,
43 T.C. 743 (1965).
28. Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965); cf. Frank W. Williamson, 27
T.C. 647, 660 (1957). But cf. H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947, 960 (1963); James
G. Murrin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955).
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but the transaction has the net result of giving nonshareholders more
than twenty per cent of the distributed stock.29 An exception to this
application of the step transaction doctrine, however, is a divisive reorganization that is undertaken to give nonshareholders an interest in
a business in which they have a vital role.30 This kind of transaction
is justified by the strength of the business need motivating it.31 As
long as the requirements of the statute are literally met, it will be
a tax free reorganization. Thus, a key employee may acquire part
interest in a newly created corporation by obtaining an interest in
the distributing corporation prior to distribution or by obtaining a
portion of the shares of the new corporation from stockholders
shortly after distribution.
Non-ProrataDistributions
While the statutory continuity of interest provision requires that
shareholders must receive control, it specifically authorizes distribution in amounts disproportional to ownership.32 As long as one
shareholder receives a controlling portion of stock, the control requirement may be satisfied. 33 Non-prorata distribution provides a
means for shareholders of a small corporation to go their separate
ways in a tax free transaction. For example, all the shares of the
controlled corporation might be distributed to a contentious minority faction in exchange for their shares in the distributing corporation. The minority faction would now control the split-off corporation exclusively, while the concordant majority would own the
distributing corporation free from interference of the minority.

29.

David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962); Rinkel v. Knox, 196 F. Supp. 21 (D.

Minn. 1961). But see Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959). The
step transaction doctrine is also used against the taxpayer to convert what looks
like a liquidation or redemption into a divisive reorganization in order to tax
property distributed as boot. See South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540
(1965); Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964).
30. James G. Murrin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955); Rena B. Farr, 24 T.C. 350 (1955);
Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 Cums. BuLL. 77. See also Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d
463 (4th Cir. 1959).
31. Patricia V. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
32. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§355 (a) (2) (A), 368 (a) (1) (D); Treas. Reg.
§1.355-3 (a) (1955). This provision was passed in order to avoid the uncertainty of
evaluation problems that would be present if shareholders were required to have
the exact same interest in corporate property after division as before division.
However, any stock distribution whose value is substantially in excess of a shareholder's interest in the corporation prior to division may be taxed as a gift or as
compensation, depending on the relevant facts. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §356 (f);
S. RE'. No. 1622, supra note 6, at 50, 274.
33. Treas. Reg. §1.355-3 (a) (1955).
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The Regulations state, however, that a non-prorata distribution
may not accomplish what is in essence a stock swap. Ordinarily, if
one of two shareholders of brother-sister corporations34 exchanges his
stock in one of the corporations for the other shareholder's stock in
the other corporation, any gain realized would be recognizable. 35 To
avoid this tax, the stock of the brother corporation could be transferred to the sister corporation as a capital contribution, and then
that stock could be transferred to a newly organized corporation,36
whose stock could be distributed to certain shareholders of the
brother corporation in exchange for their shares in the sister corporation. The shareholders of the new corporation would indirectly
37
own the brother as a result of surrendering their shares in the sister.
The efficacy of this technique is doubtful anyway because of the potential application of the common law step transaction doctrine.
Transferring stock of a corporation to a distributing corporation,
which is to use the stock as assets to form a controlled corporation,
only gives the distributing corporation transitory possession of the
stock. It has never had any affiliation with the controlled corporation
and merely has served as a conduit for a stock exchange.38
However, the scope of the limitation on non-prorata distributions
must be reexamined in light of the recent case of Albert W. Badanes.39
There, two men each owned fifty per cent of a soft drink bottling
company and fifty per cent of a small real estate company. When
they disagreed, they decided to split the business. But, the assets of
the business were of such a nature that they could not be equally
divided. In an effort to equalize the value of property to be separately
owned, the stock of the real estate company was transferred to the
distributing corporation, and that stock, two life insurance policies,
cash, and the assets of one of the bottling plants of the corporation
were transferred to a controlled corporation. The stock of the controlled corporation was then distributed to one of the men in ex34. A typical brother-sister corporate relationship exists if A and B each own
50% of the shares of Corporation X and Corporation Y.
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1001, 1031 (a).
36. This would be permitted if the capital contribution were tax free and
the stock transferred represented a business that had been actively conducted for
five years. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§355(a)(3), (b)(2)(D). See Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959).
37. Treas. Reg. §1.355-3 (a) (1955) envisions this tax avoidance situation: stock
in both the brother and sister corporations is transferred to a newly created corporation and that corporation in a non-prorata split-up distributes stock of one
corporation to one shareholder and stock of the other corporation to another
shareholder. See also facts of Penn-Warrington Hosiery Mills, Inc., 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1050 (1961).
38. Cf. Frank W. Williamson, 27 T.C. 647 (1957); Rev. Rul. 63-260, 1963-2
CUM. BULL. 147.
39. 39 T.C. 410 (1962).
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change for his stock in the distributing corporation. The nontaxability of the non-prorata split-off was upheld even though it had in
part accomplished a stock swap. Apparently, this kind of transaction
is not considered an abuse of the non-prorata provisions. The value
of the realty stock comprised only a small amount of the assets splitoff. Its transfer was a very expedient way to aid in the equalization
of property. Furthermore, as evidenced by the great disparity of the
values of the realty stock and the bottling company stock, the transaction was clearly not undertaken to accomplish a stock swap. Thus,
a resulting stock swap that is only an incidental part of the entire
transaction would not seem to be "essentially a stock swap." However, it is advised that a divisive reorganization should not result in
an incidental stock swap unless there are strong extenuating circumstances present. The Badanes case does not give shareholders of
brother-sister corporations free license to use section 355 to accomplish nontaxable stock swaps. 40
THE ACTIvE BUSINEss

REQUIREMENTS

Immediately after distribution, both the distributing and the newly
organized corporations must be conducting an active trade or business, 41 and that trade or business must have been actively conducted

for five years prior to the date of distribution.42 These provisions
are the heart of section 355. They were innovated to enable reorganizations to be evaluated objectively. They serve to reduce substantially the possibilities for earnings bail-out, which is most likely to
occur if liquid, investment, or nonessential assets are divided from a
corporation. Shareholders are not likely to abandon profitable businesses to receive a dividend at a capital gains rate.43
While seeking objectivity, the active business requirements regulate an uncertain area in the law of corporate reorganizations. Determining whether a business is active or not can be a very difficult
task. The applicable legal standards are vague, and the particular
facts of each case are highly relevant. Generally, 'owning investment
securities and stock or holding land for investment purposes does not

40. See Baum, Reshuffling of Interest of Closely Held Brother-Sister CorporaINST. ON FED. TAx 667, 681 (1964); Holmes, Regulation Section
1355 Under Fire, 68 DIcK. L. Rv. 409, 417 (1964).
41. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §355 (b) (1) (A). In case of a split-up, only the
controlled corporations are required to conduct active business immediately after
distribution provided the only assets of the distributing corporation are shares
of the controlled corporation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §355 (b) (1) (B).
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §355 (b) (2) (B).
43. Palestin, Test for Tax-Free Distribution,38 TAxEs 327, 328 (1960).

tions, N.Y.U. 22D
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constitute a trade or business. 44 But this is about as far as generalizations can go.
The leasing of buildings and land can be an active business, 45 but
determination of such depends on: (1) the substantiality of the income earned from the leased properties in relation to the total income of the corporation, 46 and (2) the existence and extent of legal
obligations owed, and the amount and constancy of services performed
by the corporation as landlord.4 7 Under these tests, a corporation
should not be viewed as being in the active business of renting property to itself or renting out a small portion of the property it occupies
in the conduct of its principal business. 4" The five-year rule apparently
implies that rental business will have to meet a more strict standard
to qualify under section 355 than was necessary to qualify under section 112(b)(11) of the 1939 Code. 49 The Regulations- specifically
provide that a corporation is not engaged in a separate active business
by virtue of owning and operating "land or buildings all or substantially all of which are used and occupied by the owner in the
operation of a trade or business." Seemingly, a corporation that
44. Treas. Reg. §§1.355-1 (c) (1), (d), Examples (1), (7) (1955). Cf. Fahs v.
Crawford, 261 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 615, 692 (1956).
However, a corporation could be in the business of selling securities or land in
addition to its primary business. See Maudlin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1952); Emmanuel, Capital Gains for Real Estate Operators, 12 U. FLA. L. REv.
280 (1959).
45. Cf. Anders I. Lagreide, 23 T.C. 508 (1954); Leland Hazzard, 7 T.C. 372
(1946); John D. Fackler, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943).
46. Rev. Rul. 58-164, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 184; Rev. Rul. 57-464, 1957-2 CuM.
BULL. 244; Rev. Rul. 57-333, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 239; Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317
F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. Caplan, The Five-Year Active Business Test, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INST.
211, 227 (1961). Cf. Gilford v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1953).
48. Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963); Rinkel v. Knox, 196
F. Supp. 21 (D. Minn. 1961); Theodore F. Appleby, 35 T.C. 755 (1961), aff'd, 296
F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962); Isabel A. Elliott, 32 T.C.
283 (1959); 3 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 536 (rev. ed. 1965);
Jacobs, Spin-offs: Pre-Distribution Two Business Rule, 19 TAX L. REv. 155, 180
(1964).
49. See Estate of Pershelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1962).
Under the 1939 Code, if the rental income were sizable, an urgent business need
present, and continuity of interest maintained, intracorporate leasing of buildings
and land was recognized as constituting an active business. Particularly favored
were spin-offs of a large amount of property motivated by a need to allow strangers
to have an interest in assets of the corporation other than the spin-off property.
Wilkins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Ill. 1960); Bondy v. Commissioner,
269 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1959); Murdock v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax. Cas.
ff9959, aff'd, 263 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1959); Rena B. Farr, 24 T.C. 350 (1955); James
G. Murrin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955); Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165 (4th
Cir. 1952).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c) (2) (1955).
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rents part of the property its uses in its primary business will not be
conducting a separate rental business unless approximately fifty per
cent of the amount and value of the property is rented out.51 Thus,
renting ten stories of an eleven-story building,52 or renting sixty to
sixty-five per cent of a corporate occupied building,53 should constitute an active business. But a bank that leases one-fourth of its floor
space 4 and an engineering firm that rents about half of the old
house it occupies probably are not conducting separate businesses. 55
The case of Bonsall v. Commissioner-6 illustrates the type of use
of land and buildings that will not constitute the conduct of active
business. In that case, a supplier of floor covering materials owned
the building used in its business. Since beginning business, it had
leased approximately five per cent of the floor space of the building
to an outsider. The corporation also owned a small adjoining building, which it had rented to an outsider for the preceding ten years, not
including the last two immediate years. The ratio of gross income
from these rental activities to the gross profits from sales of the
floor covering materials for the five years preceding distribution was
in excess of 1-to-300. An attempted spin-off of the main building and
the adjoining building was held to be taxable because the newly
organized corporation did not conduct active business immediately
after distribution. There had never been any active efforts to promote the rental activities, and the extent of these activities in comparison to the floor covering business were too small to be consequential. Although the new corporation would receive substantial
rental income from the distributing corporation to whom a lease on
the main building had been issued, the new corporation was still not
viewed as conducting active business. Without discussing the potential violation of the five-year rule inherent in this situation, the
Second Circuit simply stated that renting the major portion of the
building to the floor covering supplier was only an accommodation to
the supplying business, and thus was adjunct or incidental to it, not
independent from it.
Any activity that is incidental to the conduct of a business apparently cannot be an active business for purposes of section 355.
51.

Caplan, supra note 47, at 220; Mintz, Corporate Separations, 36 TAXES 882,

885 (1958).
52. Treas. Reg. §1.344-1 (d), Example (3) (1955). Cf. Thomas L. Williams, 12
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 186 (1956).
53. Rev. Rul. 58-164, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL 184; Rev. Rul. 56-555, 1956-2 Cum.
BULL. 210.
54. Treas, Reg. §1.344-1 (d), Example (4) (1955).
55. Isabel A. Elliott, 32 T.C. 283 (1959); cf. Theodore F. Appleby, 35 T.C. 755
(1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962).

56. 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss2/7

12

Turner: Splitting the Small Corporation by Divisive Reorganization: Inter
[Vol. XVIII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

57
An active business is defined by the Regulations as being:

[A] specific group of activities being carried on for the
purpose of earning income or profits from only such group of
activities, and the activities included in such group must include every operation which forms a part of, or a step in the
process of earning income or profit from such a group.
Therefore, a business that is incidental to an active business must be
one that does not produce income independently and accommodates
an active business so as to be only a phase in the integrated process
by which the active business produces income.5 8 Factors used to distinguish an incidental activity from a main one include: the comparative size of the gross income; the extent of geographical, managerial, and functional separation; the care with which separate
records have been kept; and the intensity with which the activity has
been conducted for profit. 59 A business that sold only replacement
parts for the major product manufactured by the corporation, that
solicited business only by mail, that had scattered sales records, and
60
produced a nominal net income might well be incidental. A dining
room for company executives, a research department for the sole use
of the company, a captive coal mine supplying only the corporate
steel mill, or a distributing agency for a company's manufactured
product are examples of what the Service considers incidental activities. 61
The categorical prohibition of the separation of incidental and
active businesses is a position that is perhaps too severe for the
57. Treas. Reg. §1.355-I (c) (1955); Young, Corporate Separations: Some Revenue Rulings Under Section 355, 71 HARV. L. REV. 843, 849 (1958) says the requisites
of an active business "involve commercial activity in the sense of some degree of
human labor or skill applied to help produce income, the existence of a profit
motive, and the necessity that the income-earning activity be a substantially self
contained unit standing on its own feet before corporation separation."
58. Treas. Reg. §1.355-I (c) (3) (1955) excludes from the definition of an active
business "a group of activities which, while a part of a business operated for
profit, and not themselves producing income even though such activities would
produce income with the addition of other activities or with large increases in
activities previously incidental or insubstantial."
59. Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1963); Patricia W. Burke,
42 T.C. 1021 (1964); Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 668 (1964); H. Grady Lester, Jr.,
40 T.C. 947 (1963); Treas. Reg. §1.355-1 (d), Examples 8, 10, 13-15 (1955); Rev.
Rul. 57-464, 1957-1 Cuss. BULL. 244; Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 Cus. BULL. 191; Rev.
Rul. 56-451, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 208.
60. Estate of Thorval J. Lockwood, 23 CCH Tax Ct., Mem. 1233 (1964), rev'd,
65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f19646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 1965) on grounds that activity was an
integrated part of a single business.
61. Treas. Reg. §1.355-1 (d), Examples 5, 7, 11, 12 (1955); Rev. Rul. 58-54,
1958-1 CuM. BULL. 181; Rev. Rul. 57-492, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 247.
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Service to maintain. Since it can work undue hardships on the
shareholders of vertically integrated corporations seeking to divisively reorganize, it may be outdated in light of the wide acceptance
of the holding of Coady v. Commissioner.62 Prior to the Coady decision, the active business provisions were thought to command that
only corporations conducting two or more active businesses could divisively reorganize. Single business corporations were thought prohibited from using section 355.63 If this interpretation of the statute
were correct, it would follow logically that an incidental activity
could not be divided from a corporation. For if it could, then a
vertically integrated single business could utilize section 355 by
spinning-off an incidental activity.
In Coady, however, a corporation conducting only a construction
business was permitted to divisively reorganize into two corporations,
each of which conducted a construction business on a smaller scale
than its predecessor. Section 355 was held to apply to a single as
long as the result of the divisive reorganization was the emergence
of two active businesses. Although the Commissioner objected to
this Sixth Circuit decision, he revoked his objection64 after two
other circuits6 5 recognized the holding.
But while agreeing that a corporation did not have to be engaged
in different business to divisively reorganize, the Commissioner was
careful to explain that the active business requirements must still be
complied with. In other words, single business corporations could
not divide businesses from themselves that did not produce income
independently. Vertical division, as opposed to horizontal division,
was impliedly sanctioned. A down-the-line split of all phases of
business activities is permissible. A manufacturing corporation with
one hundred manufacturing assets and fifty selling assets may be
divisively reorganized into two corporations each having fifty manufacturing assets and twenty-five selling assets. But a lopping off of
various business activities would not be permitted. A corporation
with one hundred manufacturing assets and fifty selling assets may
not divisively reorganize into one corporation with one hundred
manufacturing assets and one corporation with fifty selling assets.
The selling assets would comprise an activity that had been incidental to the manufacturing business. 66
62. 33 T.C. 771 (1960), 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
63. Treas. Reg. §1.355-1 (a) (1955).
64. Rev. Rul. 64-147, 1964-1 CuM. BULL (pt. 1) 136, revoking Rev. Rul. 61-198,
1961-2 CUM. BULL. 61.
65. Marrett v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963); Bonsall v. Commissioner 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
66. See Rev. Rul. 58-54, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 181. See generally Pennell, Development and Unanswered Questions in Corporate Reorganizations, 42 TAxEs 893
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If this is the Commissioner's position, it appears to be based upon
historical considerations rather than on statutory policy. 67 It makes
little difference whether a business, such as selling, is classified as incidental to another business, such as manufacturing. If both businesses
have been conducting business for five years and both are conducting
business after distribution, the underlying policy of the statute is
met. Simply because two activities are part of a vertically integrated
business, does not enhance the chances that their separation will
work an earnings bail-out. The active business provisions should be
applied to distinguish active businesses from inactive businesses, to
distinguish activities vigorously pursued for profits from those passively receiving income.a5 The conduct of business activity is the
primary consideration, not the relationship of an activity to other
activities. The passive holding of land is not an active business under the policy of the statute whether it is labeled an investment
activity or an incidental activity.69 The same is true for the rental
of a small building to a brother corporation, or for the leasing of a
small portion of the corporate occupied premises.o But to prohibit
the separation of a selling business from a corporation that is engaged primarily in manufacturing, is to place an unnecessary obstacle
in the path of flexible readjustment of the corporate structure. Suppose in the manufacturing-selling hypothetical posed above, three
shareholders own a closed corporation: Two of them are in charge of
the manufacturing activities and one is in charge of the selling activities. The shareholder in charge of the selling activities violently
disagrees with the other two. What end can be served by not permitting the dissident shareholder to own independently a business
with which he is familiar? Any splitting of the corporation other
than into its selling and manufacturing phases, no doubt, would
disrupt the corporation's activities. Threats of potential litigation
over whether incidental businesses will be active businesses for pur(1964). But see Rev. Rul. 57-34, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 240; Rev. Rul. 56-451, 1956-2
CUM. BULL. 208.

67. See Treas. Reg. §1.355-1 (d), Examples 8-10, 13-15 (1955). Before Coady,
the Commissioner could insist that a business was incidental to another and could
not be spun-off because the distributing corporation was not conducting separate
active businesses. By preserving the concept of "incidentalness," he may now
argue that the business is separate and incidental to the main business, not an
integral part of it, and therefore cannot be spun-off. See, e.g., Estate of Thorval
J. Lockwood, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1233 (1964), rev'd, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 2f9646
(8th Cir. Sept. 17, 1965), and H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947 (1963).
68. Cf. Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
69. Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963); Theodore F. Appelby,
35 T.C. 755 (1961), afl'd, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910
(1962); Isabel A. Eliott, 32 T.C. 283, 290 (1959). See note 44 supra.
70. See notes 50-55 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1965], Art. 7
1965]

NOTE

poses of section 355 will only inhibit the flexibility of doing business
that the section is designed to promote.
The Five-Year Test
In addition to requiring that each corporation emerging upon
divisive reorganization must conduct an active trade or business, the
Code 1 stipulates that "a corporation shall be treated as engaged in
the active conduct of a trade or business if and only if... such trade
or business has been actively conducted throughout the five-year
period ending on the date of distribution [and] such trade or business was not acquired within the [five-year] period... in a transaction
in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part." The fiveyear previous history requirement rests on the presumption that if a
business has been conducted actively for five years, it was not created
for the purpose of avoiding dividend taxes. 72 The mechanical nature
of the test 7 3 is based on the theory that the difference between a capital
gains tax and a dividend tax would seldom be a sufficient inducement
74
for a five-year sacrifice of assets in their normal productive capacity.
Commencement and Tacking of the Five-Year Period. To implement the congressional policy of requiring a business to operate
actively for five years, the date on which active business was begun, or
from which it is properly measured, must be known. As a general
rule, active business will commence on the date that all the income
producing activities of the business are present. 75 A manufacturing
business cannot begin activities until a factory has been constructed
and capital assets are installed. If there is a considerable lapse of
time, however, between the date on which income producing capacity
is present and the date on which the first sale receipts are received,
the latter date will probably be of primary consideration.76 The
period during which a business was conducted as a partnership or a
INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§355 (b) (2) (B), (C).
72. Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 534, 545 (1964). S. RaP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954).
73. The five-year rule permits a patient and prosperous corporation to bailout earnings by creating an active business and waiting five years, although a
71.

corporation that needs to divisively reorganize for very legitimate reasons may be

prohibited from doing so because it has not conducted business for five years. Of
course, the patient corporation must act at the risk of encountering the device
rule or the common law step transaction doctrine.
74. Mintz, supra note 51, at 883.
75. Caplan, supra note 47, at 235.
76. Rev. Rul. 57-492, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 247. This means the date of decision
to begin a new business, the date the business has liquid assets available for
expenditure, and the date preliminary activities are undertaken have no particular
relevance to determining the commencement date.
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proprietorship prior to its incorporation or during its incorporation
may be counted in determining when activities commenced, if the
business was not acquired, transferred out, or reacquired in a taxable transaction. A change in the form of conducting business does
7
not detract from the fact that business was conducted.
The statutory purpose of the five-year rule cannot be circumvented
by acquiring a business with a five-year history. The rule was designed
to require a corporation owning a business to operate it for five years.
The mere existence of a history does not establish the pride of ownership in a business that Congress thought would not be abandoned in
order to avoid dividend taxes.7 8 Therefore, if a business is purchased
in a taxable transaction, regardless when active business was begun,
the measuring date of the five-year period begins no sooner than the
date of acquisition.79 The date of acquisition is either the date of
execution of an unconditional contract to purchase, or the date of
actual physical receipt of the purchased assets if the contract is conditional. 0
The exact language of the statute regulating tacking is unclear. 81
Section 355 (b) (2) (C) provides that if a business "was not acquired
in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or
part .

.

. " then the previous history of that business may be tacked

for purposes of meeting the five-year requirement. The statute does
not specify whether a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized
includes a transaction in which gain or loss is recognized to persons
other than the transferor of the business. In a complete liquidation
for example, gain might be recognized to shareholders although the
transferor of the business was a corporation.2 Moreover, the statute
does not provide for a situation in which the purchase price exactly
equals the transferor's basis, or for a situation in which boot is distributed to the transferee-corporation but a realized loss is not recognized or the amount of the boot is exactly equal to the discrepancy
between the value of the nonrecognized property received and that
exchanged for it.83
77.

Cf. Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545 (1964). See notes 97, 98 infra.

78. Palestin, supra note 43, at 328.
79. S. REP'. No. 1622, supra note 72, at 262, 268. Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§355 (b) (2) (C), (D). This rule applies to the acquisition of a corporate business
by stock purchase. The measuring date is the date the distributing corporation
acquires §368 (c) control of the subsidiary. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §355 (b) (2)(D);
Treas. Reg. §1.355-4 (b), Example (2) (1955).
80. Edward H. Russell, 40 T.C. 810 (1963).
81. See generally
60 (Dec. 9, 1958).

REVISED REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GRouP

ON SUBCHAPTER C

82. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § §331 (a), 337(a). See Hyman H. Berghash, 43
T.C. 743 (1965). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §361 (b) (1) (A).
83. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§356 (a), (c), 351 (b).
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But these statutory gaps probably do not provide taxpaying shareholders means for escaping the effect of the five-year rule. In reference
to the five-year test of section 346 (b), which is almost identical to
that of section 355 (b), the Senate Committee Report on the 1954
Revenue Act84 states that: "a qualifying business may not have been
acquired in a purchase or in a corporate reorganization where socalled 'boot' was present." Seemingly, Congress desired to permit
tacking if the business was acquired in a "transaction in which gain
or loss was not recognized" because such transactions do not result
in the disintegration of any past work exerted to build a business,
either by way of total loss of control or by realization of a return of
capital. The shareholders of a corporation that merges or otherwise
reorganizes 5 into another corporation (later to become the distributing corporation) continue to have an interest in the corporate business
that they will not easily surrender, especially if they do not receive
a return on their investment. The same holds true for shareholders
who make a tax-free contribution to their corporation under section
351 (a) or whose corporation liquidates a controlled subsidiary tax
free under section 332 (a).
Thus, it appears that the fact of sale or the fact of distribution of
boot, instead of the fact of recognition of gain or loss, proscribes
tacking of previous business history.8 6 Yet even if the ambiguous
statutory language were applied literally to permit tacking when there
was a wash sale or a boot transaction with no recognition of gain or
loss, a subsequent divisive reorganization involving the acquired business could well be disqualified from section 355 as a device to distrib8
ute earnings. 7
Change Creating a New Business. If a business is not substantially the same as it was on the date from which the five-year period
is properly measured, it has become a new business and the five-year
period must be measured from the date of the transformation38

84. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 72, at 262. (Emphasis added.) See Treas.
Reg. §1.346-1 (c) (1955).
85. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §§361 (a), 368 (a) (1) (A) (merger and consolidation),
368 (a) (1) (F) (recapitalization), 368 (a) (1) (D) (total in partial divisive reorganizations).
86. See BrrrIER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
337 n.10 (student ed. 1963) saying a transaction in which boot is distributed but a
loss is realized is the "functional equivalent" of an ordinary purchase.
87. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CODE COMMENTARY, ch. 1, subch. C
225 (reference ed. 1955).
88. Caplin, Corporate Division Under the 1954 Code, 43 VA. L. REv. 397,
403-04 (1957); Mintz, supra note 51, at 885. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§382 (a) (1) (C) and Treas. Reg. §1.382(a)-1 (h) (5) (1962). See Treas. Reg. §1.355-
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Changes in the corporation's employees, plant, equipment, product,
and location are relevant in determining whether a business has remained substantially the same. 9 Merely changing the form of the
organization in which business is conducted, 9° or shifting the location
of a business, 91 or changing the productive capacity of a business, or
adding new or dropping old product lines92 does not change the
character of a business. But obtaining a new franchise to sell a different
brand of cars or moving a liquor business into another town after
obtaining a new license issued by that town, could cause a business to
lose its former character. 93 In any case, it is a difficult question of
fact to determine whether the change undergone has substantially
altered the nature of a business.
If the activities of a business have declined to a virtual standstill,
the business is over. Revival of the defunct business is the beginning
of a new business, and the five-year period must be measured from a
point no earlier than this new beginning. In Pridemark, Inc. v.
Commissioner,94 the sales of an exclusive dealer for prefabricated
homes decreased about one hundred per cent over a two-year period.
As a result, the dealer's relationships with his manufacturer-supplier
worsened to the point that termination of the dealership was agreed
upon. All of the dealership's uncompleted customer contracts, customer lists, branch office leases, and goodwill were then sold to the
manufacturer-supplier. The dealership also agreed to let the transferee hire any of its personnel and consequently lost all of its longstanding sales force. After the sale, dissolution of the dealership was
approved by its directors. Ten months later, former shareholders of
the dealership decided to form a new corporation, and, within a year
after dissolution, the counterpart of the dealership was once again
selling prefabricated homes in an exclusive dealership arrangement
with another manufacturer-supplier. The reestablishment of the busi4(b) (3) (1955); Rev. Rul. 59-400, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 114; Rev. Rul. 57-190, 1957-2
CUM. BULL. 121.
89. Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.382-1 (h) (5) (1962); Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner,
345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
90. Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545 (1964).
91. Rev. Rul. 56-344, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 195. Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.382 (a)-I (h) (9),
Example (2) (1962). But note that if independent activities are commenced in a
new location without termination of activities in the original location, the activities
in the new location might constitute a new business. See discussion notes 106-108
infra.
92. Treas. Reg. §1.355-4(b)(3) (1955); Estate of Lockwood v. Commissioner,
65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 1965). Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.382(a)1 (h) (8) (1962).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.382 (a)-1 (h) (9), Examples 1, 3 (1962); cf. Rev. Rul. 57-190,
1957-1 CUM. BULL. 121.
94. 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), reversing 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
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ness was held not to be a reorganization. The divestiture was too
complete for the revival to constitute a continuation of the business.
Rather, the transaction consisted of a liquidation under section 331
and a reincorporation under section 351.
While revival of a defunct business does not perpetuate the history
of the former business, a lull or cessation of business activity due to
circumstances beyond the control of the corporation does. not terminate a business if the owners intended all along to resume business
activities when circumstances permitted.95 A cooperative fruit market
was not viewed as engaging in a new business when it resumed its
marketing operations, which had been severely reduced for several
years due to adverse weather conditions. 96 In W. E. Gabriel Fabrication Co1 the Tax Court held that a corporation that transferred
all the assets of two of its businesses to -a shareholder fourteen months
prior to distribution in order to expeditiously eliminate the shareholder from the corporation while the details of divisive reorganization were being worked out, did not terminate the conduct of those
businesses for purposes of satisfying the five-year rule. When the
corporation was prepared to place the businesses in a controlled corporation, it reasserted authority over activities it had temporarily ceased
to conduct. Since a shareholder had conducted active business with
the assets, the corporation was entitled to tack that period on, since
there had been no taxable transaction involved in the transfer out of
the assets or in the reassertion of physical authority over them. 98
If the activities of a business expand rapidly during a five-year
period of time, the expansion should not cause the business to be
viewed as a new one. As long as the essential character of the business
is maintained, the policy of the five-year active business rule is complied with.9 9 The Service has indicated in Revenue Ruling 59-4000o
that if a business finances its own growth through plowed-back earn95. Caplan, supra note 47, at 237.
96.

Rev. Rul. 57-126, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 123.

97. 42 T.C. 545 (1964).
98. Id. at 554-55. If the assets had not been used in the conduct of active
business during the temporary lull in activity of the corporation, the period of
their inactivity would probably be disregarded for purposes of counting back five
years before the date of distribution. See Rev. Rul. 57-126, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 123.
Note the difference that entering into a binding lease with the shareholder
during the fourteen-month interval might have made. If rents had been charged
the corporation might be seen as discontinuing the business in favor of a rental
business. Cf. Commissioner v. Gillete Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960);
Consolidated Naval Stores v. Fahs, 227 F.2d 923 (1955), the transaction might be
regarded as one that is taxable to the transferor-shareholder.
99. Caplin, Corporate Separations: The 5-Year Business Rule, N.Y.U. 15TH
TAx INST. ON FED. TAx 623, 634 (1957) and work cited supra note 88, at 403-04.
Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.382 (a)-I (h) (8) (1962).
100. Rev. Rul. 59-400, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 114.
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ings, it will not be converted into a new business by substantial expansion. However, the ruling held that a real estate business became
a new business on the date that the other business of the corporation
contributed assets to it that composed more than fifty per cent of its
value.
The position that a one hundred per cent expansion financed by
contributed funds causes a business to assume a new character, seems
defensible only in light of the fact that a transferral of assets to the
business by the corporation may be the preliminary step in an earnings bail-out. 101 It is unfortunate that the Commissioner was asked
to rule on a case involving real estate, since the danger of bail-out is
much greater if the assets of the controlled corporation are readily
marketable. Ordinarily, it would appear the device test could be used
to prevent bail-out in instances in which the distributing corporation
finances the expansion of the business of the controlled corporation
with funds not earned by that business. 102 Moreover, a recent revenue
ruling °3 implies that the Commissioner will no longer insist that an
outside financed expansion cannot cause a business to become twice as
valuable as it was five years before. Yet still, the safest course for
small corporations to follow with regard to financing the expansion
of one business with funds of another business would be either: (1)
not to allow the value of assets contributed to a business to exceed
fifty per cent of the value of all assets of the business, or (2) to have
the business to which assets are contributed borrow money on those
assets and pay back the contributor business before distribution.104
Branch Operations as Part of One Business. Prior to Coady v.

Commissioner,105 it was essential for a corporation to establish that
its branch business was a separate business in order to separate that
business from the corporation under section 355. At that time, the
active business requirements were thought to require the presence of
two or more separate businesses. Accordingly, the Regulationslos
provided illustrations in which two retail stores selling the same line
101.

Caplin, supra note 88, at 405.

102. Caplan, The Five-Year Active Business Test, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INsT.
211, 240-41. Mr. Caplan put forward the fact that Revenue Ruling 57-400 was
focused on the five-year test instead of the device test because a ruling otherwise
might have opened the door for large contributions to be made to real estate
businesses prior to partial liquidation since §346 (b) does not have a provision
resembling the device test. It is submitted, however, that §346 (a) (1) allowing only
distributions that are "not essentially equal to a dividend" could be used to
monitor partial liquidation abuses.
103. Rev. Rul. 64-147, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. (pt. 1) 136. See note 118 infra.
104. Caplan, supra note 102, at 241.
105. 289 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1961). See notes 62-65 supra.
106. Treas. Reg. §1.355-1 (d), Examples 9, 11, 13 (1955).
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of clothing in the same town and two manufacturing plants selling
to the same customer under the same contract constituted two different
businesses. Also, the Commissioner ruled that establishing a new
operation that pursued the same line of business as that conducted
0 7
by the corporation elsewhere constituted organizing a new business.
Apparently, the Service was of the opinion that change in locale, customers, employees, and facilities caused a branch operation to assume
a substantially different character than the rest of the corporate business, 08 in spite of the fact that the purpose of a branch operation
is to duplicate the main line of business in another area.
Now that it has been established that a single business corporation
may qualify under section 355, the Commissioner has attempted to use
his pre-Coady position to block the tax free divisive reorganization of
a corporation into its branch and home operations, when the branch
operations have not been conducted five years before distribution.0 9
Instead of viewing a branch operation as an integral part of the main
business of the corporation so that the branch operation could derive
the benefit of the prior history of the corporation,110 the Commissioner has taken the position that a branch operation is separate from
the main corporate business and therefore not entitled to inherit its
previous history.
But this position seemingly will not be accorded judicial respect.
In Estate of Thorval J. Lockwood,"' a corporation selling potato
sorting machines to farmers and retail suppliers, solicited business all
over the United States. Between 1947 and 1953, a small amount of
business was done in Maine and the Northeast generally. In 1954
a branch office was set up in Maine and the solicitations were vigorously increased to all points accessible from the office. In 1956 an
attempted spin-off by the corporation of the Maine branch office was
held to be taxable by the Tax Court. It deemed the Maine office
to be a separate business that had been conducting business actively
for only two years since the activities conducted in the Northeast
107

Rev. Rul. 56-227, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 183. See Rev. Rul. 57-190, 1957-1

CuM. BuLL. 240.
108.

Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.382 (a)-l (h) (9) (1962).

109. See Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
110. An integral part of a business is to be distinguished from being an inci-

dental part of that business. An incidental business may not be able to be separated from the corporation at all and, if it can, it should have an independent
five-year history. See notes 58-69 supra. An integral operation is part of the

whole of one business. Cf. Corn Products v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). A
divisive reorganization involving an integral operation is a vertical division of
the corporation, as opposed to a horizontal division when an incidental business

is involved.
111. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Meri. 1233 (1964), rev'd, U.S. Tax Cas. 119646 (8th Cir.
Sept. 17, 1965). See Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
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before the establishment of the office were too sporadic and inconsequential to constitute a separate active business. This holding was
reversed on appeal. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the geographic
separation of the Maine office from the rest of the corporation did not
in itself confer separate business status upon the office. At the date
of distribution, the Northeastern and Maine operations were, as they
had always been, an integral part of the business of the corporation.
Therefore, the Maine operations did not have to be separately aged,
but could inherit the business history of the entire corporation.
If Lockwood is expressive of the law, the Commissioner can no
longer allege a branch operation constitutes a new business if it is
geographically separated from the rest of the corporation. He is thus
left to resort to looking for something in the nature of the branch
operation that will distinguish it from being part of the business of
the corporation. If a distinguishing point can be established, the
Commissioner can claim the operation constitutes a separate business
that has not been conducted for five years or, if it has, that the operation constitutes a separate business that is incidental to the main
business and can never be divided from the corporation. Arguably,
a corporation with several retail outlets, but having only a single
production plant, would be an integrated corporation with several
incidental businesses. 112 By arguing that a branch activity is incidental
to the main corporate business, the Commissioner can skirt the
effect of Lockwood, provided the activity has been conducted for less
than five years. But even if the activity is shown to be incidental,
if it has been conducted for five years, a challenge of its statutory
eligibility should lack substance in light of the preferrable construction of the post-distribution active business rule." 3
The Post-DistributionActive Business Rule
The Code 14 requires that all corporations emerging from a divisive reorganization must be "engaged immediately after distribution
in the active conduct of trade or business." This provision is a very
modified continuity of business enterprise test."15 Instead of contemplating that a business be continued indefinitely after distribution,
it requires only that the active character of the assets of a business be
preserved.1

6

112. Rev. Rul. 58-54, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 181.
113.

See notes 62-69 supra and 124-133 infra.

114. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § §355 (b) (1) (A), (B).
115. See Treas. Reg. §§1.355-2 (c), 1.368-1 (b) (1955).
116. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 72, at 50-51; S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951), United States Code Congressional and Administrative News at
1969; Marrett v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963); Estate of Lockwood
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The presence of a large amount of liquid or investment assets does
not prevent a corporation from being actively engaged in the conduct
of business immediately after distribution. It is generally recognized
that a corporation can be conducting business actively if up to fifty
per cent of the value of all its assets are inactive. Thus, a corporation
is not conducting active business immediately after distribution if
the value of its inactive assets is equal to or greater than the value of
117
its active assets.
In some cases, however, it might be difficult for small corporations
to keep the inactive assets of one of the emerging corporations from
exceeding fifty per cent of the value of all the assets of that corporation. This might be true if shareholders of a single business corporation that has a substantial amount of inactive assets desire to sever
the corporation into two or more parts, or if some shareholders of a
multibusiness corporation desire to take over the smallest business of
the corporation. Revenue Ruling 64-10211 has mitigated the effect
of the fifty per cent rule in these types of cases. In this ruling, a large
amount of inactive assets was placed in the newly organized corporation and the stock of that corporation was distributed in a non-prorata exchange for all the stock of certain shareholders in the distributing corporation. The distribution thus had the effect of terminating
the interest of those shareholders in the distributing corporation,1 19
and the preliminary transfer of inactive assets served to equalize the
value of the stock received with that surrendered. Although the
transfer caused the inactive assets of the new corporation to exceed the
value of its active assets, the split-off was ruled nontaxable.
Revenue Ruling 64-102 did not disclose the precise extent to which
inactive assets may exceed active assets. In the ruling, approximately
v. Commissioner, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 1965).
117. Caplin, supra note 88, at 403-04; Mintz, Corporate Separations, 36 TAxEs
882, 885 (1958). Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-164, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 184; Rev. Rul. 56-557,
1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 199. See notes 100-103 supra regarding application of the 50%
rule to cause a corporate expansion to result in the commencement of a new
business for purposes of the five-year rule.
118. Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. (pt. 1) 136.
119. There is little danger of earnings bail-out upon a non-prorata split-off
terminating a shareholder interest. This kind of transaction has the same effect as
a complete redemption of an interest under §302 (b). Allowing the transaction to
have tax-free status, therefore, only postpones recognition of a capital gain, which
is exactly what the statute is designed to do. However, because §302 (b) (1) denies
capital gains treatment to redemptions that are substantially equivalent to a dividend, the exception to the 50% rule endorsed by Rev. Rul. 64-102 probably will not
be extended to: (a) prorata stock exchanges or spin-offs; (b) non-prorata spin-offs;
and (c) non-prorata exchange not terminating an interest (unless the exchange
was great enough to reduce substantially the recipient's interest in the distributing

corporation).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss2/7

24

Turner: Splitting the Small Corporation by Divisive Reorganization: Inter
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

fifty-eight per cent of the new corporation's assets were inactive. But
relative proportions probably will be unimportant if the corporation
continues to carry on business and uses the inactive assets to expand
business activity.120 As long as the purpose of transferring a substantial amount of inactive assets to the new corporation is to equalize
the value of the exchanged stock, the reorganization should qualify.
However, if the assets transferred substantially exceed the value of
the stock exchanged, although not by an amount great enough to
violate the post-distribution active business rule or to demonstrate
that the purpose of the transfer was to bail-out earnings, the excessive
amount transferred may be taxed as a gift or as compensation.121
Post-DistributionSameness. The language of the Code122 furnishes
support for interpreting the post-distribution active business rule as
requiring each corporation after distribution to conduct the same
business as that conducted by its predecessor prior to distribution.
Reference is made to the fact that in order for a business to be considered active, "such business" must have been actively conducted
for five years and "such business" must not have been acquired in a
taxable transaction five years before distribution.
Construing the statute to command pre-distribution and post-distribution sameness enables small corporations to divisively reorganize
with ease if they have conducted one or more clearly defined active
business for five years. But such a construction can inhibit similar
1 3
action by small corporations conducting interrelated activities. 2
For example, suppose animals are raised on a ranch to produce hormones for the manufacture of drugs. If the corporation effects a nonprorata split-off so that one of its two shareholders gets the ranch,
while the other shareholder gets the drug manufacturing business, is
the ranch, which now raises beef cattle, still conducting the same
business as its predecessor? Any findings pursuant to this line of inquiry would be unnecessarily restrictive. Since the underlying pur120. See Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914, 923-25 (1964); H. Grady Lester, Jr.,
40 T.C. 947, 959-61 (1963); Albert W. Badanes, 39 T.C. 410, 416 (1962).
121. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §356 (f); S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 72, at 50,
274. Possibly this situation could be alleviated if the shareholders who receive
control of the new corporation purchase up to 20% of its stock. A greater purchase
would violate the distribution and control requirements. See Commissioner v.
Day 9: Zimmerman, Inc., 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945); note 24 supra.
122. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §355 (b) (2) (B), (C). See Estate of Lockwood v.
Commissioner, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 1965); Curtis v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1964).
123. Jacobs, IRS Now Concedes That a Single Business May be Divided Under
§355, 21 J. TAXATION 22, 23 (1964) (interesting hypothetical posed). See Edward H.
Russell, 40 T.C. 810, 821 n.5 (1963); see also H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947
(1963).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

25

1965]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1965], Art. 7
NOTE

pose of the active business test is to prevent inactive businesses from
being divided from active businesses, it should not make any difference
that the business of the newly organized corporation does not exactly
24
coincide with any previous activity of the distributing corporation.
It is only important that the new corporation be engaged in some
kind of active business that has a traceable five-year history.
There is good analogous support for the position that the postdistribution active business requirement is satisfied if the new corporation conducts a business that is different from its predecessor.
Cases 2 5 under the 1939 Code have held that a corporation emerging
from a reorganization does not have to conduct a business that is
similar to any conducted by the reorganizing corporation. Two cases
involved reorganizations similar to those effected under section 355,
one'126 finding the transaction nontaxable, the other27 finding the
transaction taxable because boot -was distributed in connection with
it. A case decided under the 1954 Code upheld the nontaxability of
a divisive reorganization effected through section 354, although the
business of the emerging corporation differed from that of the distributing corporation. 28 Furthermore, the reasoning of these cases
was followed in a revenue ruling129 involving a section 368 (a) (1) (C)
stock for property reorganization. Since there are some instances in
which a (C) reorganization will be treated as if it were a (D) reorganization, 30 it appears that the Commissioner intended his ruling
to have some application to the area of divisive reorganizations.' 31
124. Cf. International Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 678 (1948), afj'd per
curiam, 175 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1949).
125. Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.
1956); Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Wilkins v. United
States, 188 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Ill. 1960). See WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952);
Morley Cypress Trust, 3 T.C. 84 (1944).
126. Wilkins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
127. Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.

1956).
128.

Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1961). The case in fact

held that the merging business could be entirely different from any conducted
by the distributing corporation. However, §354 does not have a five-year rule.
The application of the rule would prohibit a business from being entirely different
from any of the distributing corporations.
129. Rev. Rul. 63-29, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 77, revoking Rev. Rul. 56-330, 1956-2
Cum. BULL. 204.
130. INT. R v. CoDE OF 1954, §368 (a) (2) (A). If the corporation receiving the

stock of an acquiring corporation in exchange for assets is a controlled subsidiary,
a [C] reorganization could be created as a [D] reorganization. When the subsidiary
liquidates and distributes the shares of the acquiring corporation to the parent's

shareholders, it is as though the parent has transferred assets that were in the
subsidiary to the acquiring corporation, receiving that corporation's stock in ex-

change and then distributing it.
131. The ruling is probably confined to a §354 reorganization since it is the
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Indeed there is no reason why the Commissioner should categorically insist that the new corporation must conduct the same type of
business as the distributing corporation. The new corporation could
certainly change the character of its business shortly after distribution.132 Therefore, restricting a change immediately after distribution
would be a requirement of form only. Assets could be incorporated
and then converted a few days after distribution. The post-distribution rule should not substitute for the device rule. If the change in
the character of the business demonstrates an intent of shareholders
to bail-out earnings, the transaction can be taxed regardless of the
time the change occurred. 33
The Commissioner, however, will be concerned with showing that
the business of the new corporation is different from its predecessor
if (1) the business claims to be an integral part of a five-year business
and thus adequately aged by association, 134 (2) the business has an
independent history that is traceable to an activity that was incidental
to another business,135 or (3) the business is so radically different
that it must constitute a new business that is devoid of any business
history and therefore violative of the five-year rule.
The five-year rule and the post-distribution active business rule
are complementary congressional safeguards that should be strictly
construed.13 6 Whatever the business of the new corporation, it cannot be an active business unless it has a five-year history.13 7 If the
business is the same as that of the distributing corporation, it may
acquire its history by association. But if a business is distinct from its
predecessor, it must establish an independent five-year history. Such
an independent history can be established by reasonably tracing back
active operations. 13 8 For example, the ranch used to supply hormones
type of reorganization with which a [C] reorganization can coincide. Cf. Curtis v.
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1964). See Ross, Caution in Using the Continuity Rule of Revenue Ruling 63-29 for Corporate Divisions, 21 J. or TAXATION
130, 132 (1964). Nevertheless, the ruling is analogous support for permitting a
business to be different in form from its predecessor while conducting traceably
similar activities.
132. Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1955); Bentsen v.
Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363, 367 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Ross, supra note 131, at 132;
Lipnick, Nontaxable Corporate Separations, 2 HOUSTON L. REV. 344, 361 (1965).
But see Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
133. See notes 157-159 infra.
134. See notes 105-113 supra.
135. See notes 57-70 supra.
136. Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714, 721 (6th Cir. 1964); Estate of
Thorval J. Lockwood, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1233 (1964), rev'd, 65-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17 1965) (on another application of fact).
137. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §355 (b) (2). See notes 71-74 supra.
138. Cf. Wilkins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D. Il1. 1960). Cf. also
Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1932). See notes 99, 100, 118 supra.
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to a drug manufacturing business may have become a beef cattle farm,
but its former activities of buying, feeding, and slaughtering animals
are still traceable.
On the other hand, if a business cannot reasonably relate its activities back to any conducted by the distributing corporation, then
that business must be without a past history.139 A drug manufacturing
corporation that suddenly spins-off an insurance business must have
undertaken a new business just prior to distribution. This emergence
of a business that is entirely unrelated to any activity conducted by
the distributing corporation would violate the purpose of the fiveyear rule. There would be no way to determine whether shareholders
had the vested interest in the business that the rule requires. The
fact that a new corporation could change over to an entirely new line
of business a short time after distribution is irrelevant. A conversion
of assets before distribution would not guarantee that the assets used
for the conversion would be assets held for five years by the distributing corporation. This could only be assured if the assets to be converted were specifically segregated from the distributing corporation
at the time distribution was completed.
Step TransactionInactivity. The function of the post-distribution
rule is to insure that the emerging corporations are actively conducting businesses with traceable five-year histories. If active assets predominate in the corporations immediately after distribution, the
literal provisions of this rule are complied with. Events subsequent
to the brief moment after distribution normally would not be perti1 40
In Curtis v. United States,'4'
nent to the satisfaction of the rule.
however, such events were viewed as so closely related to the distribution itself that they caused the post-distribution rule to be violated.
In Curtis, a corporation wanted to merge with a larger corporation
conducting a similar business. The latter insisted that the corporation dispose of a warehouse business that it was conducting. The
warehouse was spun-off and the corporation merged into the other.
This series of transactions was viewed as a single transaction having
the objective of accomplishing the merger. The spin-off had been a
step toward preparing the corporation for the merger. Therefore,
fictionally, the merger had occurred simultaneously with the spin-off.
Since the distributing corporation was merged into another corporation at the time of distribution, it was nonexistent immediately after
distribution and could not be conducting active business then.
139.
140.
sidered
holders
141.

See notes 88-98 supra.
See notes 116, 132 supra. Events subsequent to distribution are conunder the device rule of §355 (a) (1) (B) in determining whether shareintended to use the transaction primarily to distribute earnings.
215 F. Supp. 885, (N.D. Ohio 1963), affd, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
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A short time after Curtis, the Tax Court wrestled with the proposition that a corporation participating in a divisive reorganization
may not submerge into a stranger corporation without violating the
post-distribution active business rule. In Mary Archer W. Morris
Trust, 14 2 a state bank spun-off its insurance business in order to merge
with a national bank. The court, using a functional analysis, first
held that the spin-off had a good business purpose. It then dismissed
the allegation that the transaction taken as a whole violated the postdistribution rule. The distributing corporation was seen as continuing business after the merger on the basis of United States Code,
volume 12, section 215 (e), which provides that consolidated banks
shall be deemed to be the same banks as those that participated in
the consolidation. Had the technical escape not been present, it is
difficult to predict what the court would have done. It apparently
felt duty bound to recognize the Curtis holding of the Sixth Circuit,
but regarded that holding as inapplicable to the type of situation
before it.
From a policy point of view, it is illogical to apply the step
transaction doctrine to tax a prima facie divisive reorganization that
is followed by a merger or other change of a participating corporation's form of conducting business. 14 3 As long as an emerging corpo44
ration is actively conducting a business with a traceable history,
the chances of earnings bail-out are not increased because the corporation alters its method of operation shortly after distribution. 1 4 5
Though a gain might be realized by a tax-free exchange of stock
subsequent to distribution, no bail-out occurs until the stock is sold
Moreover, it is submitted that any disappearance of a corporate business after distribution by merger, sale, liquidation, and otherwise
should not be approached by the post-distribution rule. That rule
tests the activity of a business immediately after distribution. Rather,
142. 42 T.C. 779, 791-92 (1964); see note 184 infra.
143. Cordes, The Device of Divisive Reorganizations, 10 KAN. L. REv. 21, 45
(1962); Ross, supra note 131, at 133; Comment, 51 VA. L. REv. 340, 344 (1965).
Cf. §351 and note 132 supra.
144. Note that there could be no violation of the five-year rule in either
Curtis or Morris. All the corporate businesses involved had conducted business
for five years and the merger itself was nontaxable under §361 (a).
145. See Mary Archer Morris W. Trust, 42 T.C. 779, 786 (1964); Gross v.
Commissioner, 88 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1937); Ballwood v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d
733 (3d Cir. 1936). Possibly the change of form is warily viewed with regard to
private corporations as opposed to public corporations. Noticeably, a subsequent
merger of closely held private corporations results in substantial loss of meaningful
control of that corporation by its shareholders, whereas in public corporations
the shareholder control is diffuse from the beginning. Compare Rev. Rul. 58-68,
1958-1 CuM. BULL. 183, with Rev. Rul. 56-554, 1956-2 Cums. BULL 198, and Mary
Archer Morris W. Trust, 42 T.C. 779, 782 (1964).
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the device provision should be utilized to disqualify the whole transaction if it is shown to have been undertaken with an intent to bailout earnings.146
THE DEVICE PROVISION

The Code 1 47 provides that a tax free divisive reorganization is permissible only if "the transaction was not used principally as a device
for the distribution of earnings and profits ... ." However, this provision does not prohibit shareholders from undertaking divisive reorganization in order to save taxes. There is no impropriety in
minimizing taxes by electing a nontaxable method to readjust the
corporate method of doing business.148 In fact this is the purpose of
section 355.1 9 The statute only forecloses an attempt by shareholders
to disguise what is essentially a dividend with the facade of a nontaxable transaction.50
The device rule functions as a broad safeguard against earnings
bail-out. It is flexible and subjective and enables the trier of fact
to examine all the circumstances peculiar to a transaction and to
determine the probable motivating intent of shareholders.151 The
more factors present that indicate a bail-out could be accomplished,
the more it appears that the motivating purpose of the transaction
was to allow shareholders to enjoy earnings without paying a dividend
tax.
The common law doctrines of continuity of shareholder interest,
continuity of business enterprise, and business purpose are implemented through the device rule so that case law is available to provide guidelines for discovering the intent of shareholders.J52 The
146. With regard to subsequent mergers, this approach was taken in Rev. Rul.
58-68, 1958-1 CuM. BuLL. 183. See also Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d
732 (4th Cir. 1938).
147. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §355 (a) (1) (B).
148. Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165, 172-75 (7th Cir. 1952);
Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, 130 F.2d 791, 795-97 (3d Cir. 1942); Bertha M.
Bailey, 37 B.T.A. 647, 654-55 (1938). Cf. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv.
Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
149. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1954).
150. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 485 (1935). Cf. §§302 (b) (1), 306 (c) (1) (B), and 346 (a) (2).
See Michaelson, Business Purpose and Tax Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J. 14,
40.41 (1952).
151. Estate of Parshesky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 21 n.20 (2d Cir. 1962).
152. See Treas. Reg. §1.355-2(b) (3) (1955). Treas. Reg. §1.355-2 (c) (1955)
read in light of Treas. Reg. §1.302-2 (1955) implies that common law doctrines are
still operative to tax shareholders of a corporation that has no earnings and
profits. But if the effect of a divisive reorganization could be accomplished by
methods that would result only in a capital gain, such as partial liquidation,
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continuity-of-interest doctrine as evolved at common law has had
many of its facets preempted by provisions of section 355,153 but it
still addresses itself to the question of how long the shareholders
continue to own their interest in the reorganized corporation. A sale
or exchange of a large number of shares a few days after distribution
is the ideal case of failure of continuity of interest.154 Contrarily, a
sale or exchange of only a small number of shares by one of several
stockholders1 59 or a sale or exchange of a large number of shares
three or four years after distribution have been held not to disturb
continuity of interest. 156 There can be no exact standard. Any loss
of interest at any time might evidence that the transaction was used
as a device, depending on other relevant circumstances.
The continuity of business enterprise doctrine somewhat overlaps
the continuity of interest doctrine in that both anticipate that the
corporation after distribution will continue business indefinitely.15
Functioning alone, however, the continuity of business enterprise
doctrine could be employed to pierce a transaction in which there
was a marked conversion of business assets to liquid and marketable
assets.' 5 8 This conversion might evidence an intent to use the reorganization as a means to distribute property out of the new corporation at a lower tax cost than if the property had been distributed
directly from the distributing corporation. For example, if the new
corporation operates at a loss so as to wash its carried-over earnings
and profits, cash might be distributed directly to shareholders without
tax even though the distributing corporation continuously maintains
a large amount of current and accumulated earnings. 159
§346 (b), or redemption in termination of an interest, §302 (b) (3), there should be
no objection to a deferral of taxes because section 355 is designed to postpone
capital gains. See Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144, 150 (1962); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §306 (c) (2); Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. (pt. 1) 136; Jacobs, The
Pre-Distribution Two-Business Rule-Edmund P. Coady and Beyond, 19 TAx L.
REV. 155, 178 (1962). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283,
291-92 (1945).
153. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § §355 (a) (1) (A) (ii), (D), (2) (A). See H. R. REP.
No. 1337, supra note 149, at 121.
154. E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Electrical Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937); Philip J. Cogan, 36 B.T.A. 639 (1937).
155. Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914, 919, 924 (1964); H. Grady Lester, Jr.,
40 T.C. 946, 960 (1963). See Rev. Rul. 56-345, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 206.
156. Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165, 172 (7th Cir. 1952); Lewis
v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 647 (1st Cir. 1949).
157. See Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (ist Cir. 1949); Gross v.
Commissioner, 88 F.2d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1937).
158. Standard Realization Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 708 (1948). Cf. Lynch
v. United States, 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949).
159. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 291-92 (1945); see
INT.

REv. CODE OF

1954, § §381 (a), (c) (2), 316 (a), 301 (c) (1), 312 (f) (1).
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The business-purpose doctrine was evolved to protect the integrity
of the reorganization provisions against sham transactions. The
principal purpose of a reorganization must not be tax avoidance 6 0
The taxpayer must show that the transaction was undertaken for a
reason other than bailing-out earnings. 161 The mere assertion of a
business purpose will not necessarily substantiate a divisive reorganization. Since the business purpose test is essentially a judicial
balancing test, the asserted purpose must be measured against the
possibility of earnings bail-out before its merit can be known.
The Regulations 62 require that the reason offered to substantiate
a divisive reorganization must be "germane to the business of the
corporation
and . . . required by business exigencies." This requirement contemplates that the business of distributing corporation
tion must be benefited by the readjustment in corporate form, such
as becoming disaffiliated with a risky business,163 facilitating or decentralizing management, 164 or maintaining a desirable corporate
status or level of operation.165 Quite possibly, however, a reorganization will be justified if it benefits the shareholders of a corporation
instead of benefiting the corporate business directly. This type of
justification would be based on the theory that shareholders of closely
held corporations will always operate their business in a manner most

160. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935). Cf. James Realty Co.
v. United States, 280 F.2d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1960). See Michaelson, supra note
150, at 40-41; Spear, Corporate Business Purpose in Reorganization, 3 TAx L. REv.
225 (1947).
161. Failure to introduce a justifying business purpose, however, will not establish that a transaction is not a reorganization if the issue is whether property
distributed in connection with the transaction will be taxed as boot. See Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935). A purpose can be found from
the facts of the case, Lewis v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 839 (Ist Cir. 1947),
decision after remand, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
162. Treas. Reg. §§1.368-2(g), -1 (b) (1955); Treas. Reg. §1.355-2(c) (1955).
163. Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165, 175 (7th Cir. 1952); Rev.
Rul. 56-554, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 198; Rev. Rul. 56-344, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 195. Cf.
Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1601 (1964).
164. Lockwood v. Commissioner, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119646 (8th Cir. Sept. 17,
1965); Marrett v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963); Rev. Rul. 56-451,
1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 208.
165. For example, to qualify for a profit-sharing trust (§581) or a stock option
plan (§1244), as a small business (§§1371-77), or a western hemisphere trade
corporation (§§921-22). See Thompson, 1958 Revenue Act, U. So. CAL. 1959 TAx
INST. 1, 20; Michaelson, supra note 150, at 35-36. See also H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40
T.C. 947, 960 (1963). Oftentimes, however, the special provision under which the
corporation is trying to qualify will have a special restrictive provision. For example, 52 Stat. 1060-3 (r) (1938), 29 U.S.C. 207 (r) (1961) makes a spin-off designed
to escape minimum wages abortive. Rates are applied to unifiedly operated businesses, which can be in one or more corporations.
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likely to benefit themselves and, therefore, corporate benefit and
shareholder benefit are indistinguishable.

1 66

In Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner167 a sole shareholder
seventy-nine years old, spun-off a lucrative real estate business from a
wholesale lumber and mill-work business in order to make the real
estate business readily available to his executors as a separate asset
of his estate. This had the effect of greatly facilitating the distribution
of the estate when the shareholder died a year or so later. Even
though there was no acceptable business purpose advanced, the
Second Circuit felt that the motivation for the spin-off was not unreasonable. It would appear that the more closely associated shareholders are to the corporation and the more pressing the personal
need is, the more likely a court will find the asserted motivation
properly justifying actions taken.
Practically, it should make little difference whether courts place
personal and commercial reasons on equal standing. Often the welfare of a small corporation is so closely identifiable with that of its
shareholders that whatever can be classified as a shareholder benefit
also will be a material benefit to the corporate business. 68 For example, a divisive reorganization to break a shareholder deadlock, to
avoid a restraint of trade order, or to enable a key employee to have
an interest in the business would benefit both the corporation and
its shareholders. But if solely a personal need should prompt shareholders to divisively reorganize their corporation, and the need has
substance, the transaction will probably be looked upon favorably if
continuity of shareholder interest and business enterprise are sufficiently maintained.

1 69

The Fact of Sale or Exchange
Earnings bail-out cannot occur unless distributed or retained stock
is ultimately sold or exchanged. Therefore, the fact of sale or exchange is evidence that the transaction was used principally as a
device. A conclusive finding of device, however, will not be made
until all relevant fact and circumstances are analyzed under the
166. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (Ist Cir. 1949); Estate of
Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1962); Ballenger v. United
States, 301 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1962).
167. 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing 34 T.C. 946 (1961).
168. Note treatment accorded asserted purpose in Holz v. United States, 176
F. Supp. 330, 336 (D. Minn. 1959) and Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463, 466
(4th Cir. 1959), reversing 30 T.C. 1037 (1958).
169. Wilkins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91, 97 (S.D. I1. 1960); Lewis v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1949). Cf. Survaunt v. Commissioner,
162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947).
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common law doctrines.170 The amount of shareholder interest lost,
the degree and kind of change in business enterprise, and the substantiality of the business purpose must all be considered. Other
pertinent evidence, such as the fact of greatly changed circumstances,
may be introduced to negate the device purpose implication that a
sale or exchange creates. Thus, if the regional product market of
a spun-off business collapses a few months after distribution, liquidation of the spun-off corporation should not be seen as the consummation of a scheme to distribute earnings.17 ' The coincidentalness
of the realization of a bail-out is pertinent rebutting evidence. The
fact that the value of the stock of a split-off corporation unexpectedly
skyrockets within a short period of time after distribution should help
establish the fact that subsequent stock sales by shareholders were
motivated by the desire to capitalize on fortuitous circumstances and
not to fulfill preconceived calculations. 72 The maintenance of continued indirect interest in a business is also relevant evidence. If a
sole shareholder retains distributed stock for four years and then
exchanges it for stock in a larger corporation, which he continues to
hold indefinitely, any notion of preplanned bail-out would seem
unfounded. 173 Other facts that might be introduced to reveal a genuineness of purpose include: the regularity of dividend history before
and after reorganization, the unrelatedness of shareholders making
sales to those not making sales, and the availability of other taxsaving channels for the distribution of earnings, such as salaries and
pension plans. 7 4
PrearrangedSale or Exchange
The Regulations strongly imply that proof of a prearranged sale
that the divisive reorganior exchange will give rise to a presumption
75
zation was motivated by a bad intent:"
If, pursuant to an arrangementnegotiated or agreed upon
prior to the distribution of stock.., of the controlled corporation, part or all of the stock . . . of either corporation are
sold or exchanged after the distribution, such sale or exchange
will be evidence that the transaction was used principally as a
170. Treas. Reg. §§1.355-2 (b) (1), (3) (1955).
171.

Cf. Lea v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1938); Bertha M. Bailey,

37 B.T.A. 647, 654 (1938).
172. Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1951). See Rev. Rul. 56-544, 1956-2
Cum. BULL. 198.
173. Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165, 172 (7th Cir. 1952). See
note 144 supra. But see notes 141, 145 supra.
174. Cf. United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1958).
175. Treas. Reg. §1.355-2 (b) (1) (1955). (Emphasis added.)
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. If a sale of

such stock or securities is made after the distribution and is
not pursuant to an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon
prior to the distribution, the mere fact of such sale is not determinative that the transaction was used principally as a device . . . but such fact will be evidence that the transaction

was used principally ....
It would appear that the qualifying clause prefatory to the statement
that an after distribution sale "will be evidence," gives the phrase
a different meaning in relation to the statement about prearranged
sales to which no qualifying clause is affixed. Seemingly, the absence
of the qualifying clause must mean the two types of sales are going to
be treated differently. If the fact of a nonplanned sale is evidentiary,
then the fact of a planned sale must be presumptous.' 7

6

One au-

77

thority," however, feels that the purpose of the regulation regarding
prearranged sales is to indicate the "scope and meaning of device . . .
not

. . .

to lay down technical rules of evidence." His theory is that

proof of prior negotiations should not foreclose inquiry into the
actual motivating intent of shareholders more than any other evidence, although such proof tends strongly to characterize the transaction as undertaken for bail-out purposes.
For practical purposes, it makes little difference whether proof
of preplanning will establish a presumption of device or will just be
evidence of device intent. In actuality, proof that negotiations to sell
or exchange stock were entered into prior to distribution is very
damaging evidence. 17 8 The fact of preplanning and deliberate negotiations can be enough to taint the transaction as odiously resembling a dividend, even when the corporation has continued active
business and shareholders have maintained some continuity of ownership.179 Thus, as a useful operating rule, proof that a sale or exchange was made pursuant to prior negotiations will establish a re176. Indeed, there is authority that fact of prearrangement will establish an
almost conclusive presumption of a device intent. 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §20.102, at 446 (rev. ed. 1957); Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Farlean &
Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organization and Reorganizations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 393, 432 (1955).
177. Cordes, supra note 143, at 41-42. See also Comment, 67 YAL L.J. 38,
53-54 (1957); Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 177; Mary Archer Morris W.
Trust, 42 T.C. 779, 790 (1964); Treas. Reg. §1.355-2(b)(2) (1955) (indicating that
only a binding prearrangement will be presumed to be a device).
178. See Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938); Rev. Rul.
55-103, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 31, 32.
179. Rev. Rul. 58-68, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 183. Cf. Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939);
Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714 (1964).
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buttable presumption that the transaction was used principally as a
device to distribute earnings. Such rebuttable presumption can only
be counteracted by a demonstration that an urgent business need
compelled prearrangement.
The Revenue Service 8 0 has recognized that the need to allow a
nonshareholder employee to have a large interest in a particular
business is a business need that is compelling enough to justify prior
negotiations. In Rena B. Farr,:"" a spin-off of certain business property was held to be nontaxable, although it was obviously undertaken
to facilitate a subsequent sale of a fifty per cent interest in the distributing corporation to the manager of the business of that corporation. Had the manager not received such an interest, the Studebaker Corporation would have revoked the automobile franchise of
the distributing corporation because its sole stockholder was a widow.
Studebaker felt the franchise could not be operated successfully unless
a man owned a substantial interest in it.
The case of Bondy v. CommissionerI s2 presents another instance
of permissible preplanning. As part of a divorce settlement, a controlling portion of the shares of a spun-off corporation were transferred to the wife of the sole shareholder of the distributing corporation shortly after distribution. The automobile dealership of the
distributing corporation had been in danger of being disfranchised
before the divorce proceeding began. The Ford Motor Company
wanted the corporation to dispose of a very large building whose
operation it regarded as perilous to the success of the dealership.
With the divorce action pending, the threat of disfranchisement was
compounded. The Ford Company did not want the wife of a stockholder to obtain a large interest in the business as part of the divorce
award. To avert this possibility and to place himself in the good
graces of the company again, the stockholder spun-off the controversial
building in order to have assets other than the stock of the distributing corporation available to settle the claims of his wife. Under the
1939 Code, the buildingls3 was held to be justifiable spun-off because
the preservation of the dealership depended on its liberation from
the constant menace of the divorce suit.

180. Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 Cubi. BULL. 77. See also Ballenger v. United
States, 301 F.2d 192, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1962).
181. 24 T.C. 350 (1955). See also Rinkel v. Knox, 196 F. Supp. 21 (D. Minn.
1961); Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965); Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021

(1964).
182. 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959).
183. The building might not constitute an active business under §355 (b). See
note 49 supra.
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1 4
In Mary Archer Morris W. Trust,'
a state bank was legally prohibited from merging with a national bank as long as it retained its
insurance business. Tailoring off the insurance business in anticipation of the merger was upheld as a valid business purpose since the
merger would be beneficial to the banking business and the corporation had no choice but to separate if it desired to merge. In the
light of the existence of the legal prerequisite and in light of the
extended continuance of active business of the merged corporation, it
was obvious to the fact finder that no motive to distribute earnings
was present. The preplanned diminishment of control was outbalanced by the genuineness of the resulting benefit to the business of
the distributing corporation.

Device Without Sale or Exchange
The Commissioner has asserted that any divisive reorganization
may be subject to the device test regardless whether distributed or
retained stock was sold or exchanged by stockholders subsequent to
distribution. 185 However, he is yet to have success with his contention, 186 seemingly because stockholders have acted in accord with congressional policy if they maintain full control of an active business.
But this does not mean that the Commissioner is precluded from
asserting the device test against shareholders just because all of them
retain their shares.18 7 It simply means that their burden of proof is
considerably reduced. They do not have to rebut the fact of preplanning or the implication of a bad purpose that is created by the
introduction of evidence of a sale or exchange. No compelling business reason has to be demonstrated. Shareholders have only to show
their good faith in order to convince the trier of fact that the whole
transaction was not a scheme to distribute earnings. Good faith can
be proved by demonstrating that assets are being used in the conduct
of active business just as they were prior to distribution18s Also, an
assortment of business reasons, no one of which is substantial to
justify reorganization alone, may collectively establish good faith.18 9

184. 42 T.C. 779 (1964). See note 142 supra.
185. Treas. Reg. §1.355-2 (b) (B) (1955). Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.302-2 (1955).
186. Wilkins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91, 94 (S.D. Ill. 1961). See Holz v.
United States, 176 F. Supp. 330 (D. Minn. 1959). But see Bonsall v. Commissioner,
317 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1963).
187. See notes 157-159 supra.
188. Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964); Treas. Reg. §1.355-2 (b) (3) (1955).
189. Cf. Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914, 922 (1964); H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40
T.C. 947, 958 (1963); David T. Grubbs, 40 T.C. 42, 51 (1962).
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CONCLUSION

Distinguishing between active and incidental businesses might
be a very litigable issue for small corporations seeking to use section
355. However, the Commissioner probably will not be concerned if
shareholders choose to divide an activity from the corporation that
is subordinate to the main business of the corporation as long as the
subordinate activity has been functioning for five years. It is unimportant whether a corporation with three stores, each selling entirely
different products, splits-off one of the stores or assets from each
store, provided one of the stores has not begun operations within five
years of distribution. If one has begun operations, it cannot become
the business of the newly organized corporation unless all the stores
were found to constitute a single business of which the separated
store was an integral part.
Real estate holdings must be given special consideration, however.
In spite of the fact that large amounts of income may be produced
by leasing property, receipt of that type of income can be a very passive matter depending on the actual responsibilities of the corporation to its tenants. For example, if a corporation rents a building to
a partnership whose members are also corporate shareholders, the
rental activity has a decidedly passive character. The same is true if
the corporation is renting property substantially occupied by it in
the conduct of its business. By making long-term lease arrangements,
the property could be spun-off, the stock sold, and shareholders could
bail-out earnings without a corresponding sacrifice of the actual use
of the assets by the corporation.
Though it appears especially risky to attempt to utilize section
355 when real estate or other marketable assets are involved, in no
case should divisive reorganization be undertaken lightly. Some
actual commercial or shareholder need should be present. If shareholders have every intention of continuing active business, the need
does not have to be especially compelling. It will suffice if it reasonably requires the separation of assets into another corporation. After
distribution, all distributed stock should be held for a considerable
period of time. If a good opportunity for sale or exchange subsequently presents itself, it should be carefully and cautiously considered. There is nothing wrong with a bona fide disposition, but a
ready acceptance of an offer might evidence an intent to bail-out
earnings.
MARTIN STEPHEN TURNER
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